MORE MATERIAL OMISSIONS BY THE GAO

The army paid the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) over $900,000.00 to conduct a survey of over 2,600 soldiers fresh off combat. We highlighted portions of the CNA report below in blue. However, all GAO could dig up, and to make us look bad is the following in red:

December 2006: The Center for Naval Analysis released an Army-sponsored study that sought to obtain a broader understanding of soldiers’ views about their small arms in combat. One of the conclusions reached in the report was that soldiers had confidence in the reliability of their small arms, irrespective of whether the small arms lubricant was approved or not.

Background: Project Manger, Soldier Weapons (PMSW) asked the Center for Naval Analysis, (CNA) Corporation to conduct a formal independent review of Soldier perspectives on their small arms in combat situations. The report, Soldiers Perspectives on Small Arms in Combat, Dec 2006, compiled the results of over 2,600 surveys of Soldiers who had engaged in a firefight in Iraq or Afghanistan and then returned to America within the previous 12 months.

Bottom Line Up Front: Confidence in the reliability of Army weapons doubles and weapon stoppages decrease by 50% when using MILITEC-1 dry lubricant versus the Army issued CLP wet lubricant.

Point 1. “Using a dry lubricant on the M4 decreased the probability of experiencing a stoppage by half.” ¹

Point 2. “Soldiers using a non-Army issued lubricant were almost two times more likely to report confidence in the reliability of their weapon. M9 users were over 21 times more likely to report confidence in weapon reliability if they reported using a non-Army issued lubricant.” ²

Point 3. “Frequency of disassembled cleanings had no effect on the occurrence of stoppages.” ³

Point 4. “Soldiers reporting a high frequency of lube application (one or more times per day) were more likely to experience stoppages.” ⁴

Findings and Discussion:

Point 1. “Using a dry lubricant on the M4 decreased the probability of experiencing a stoppage by half.” ⁵ The study found that 62% of all Soldiers still use the Army approved CLP. Of the 38% of Soldiers using other lubricants, 55% use MILITEC-1.

Point 2. “Soldiers using a non-Army issued lubricant were almost two times more likely to report confidence in the reliability of their weapon. M9 users were over 21 times more likely to report confidence in weapon reliability if they reported using a non-Army issued lubricants” ⁶ . With weapons jamming 19-30% of the time in engagement with the enemy,⁷ it is imperative to adopt the lessons learned by our front line troops.

Point 3. “Frequency of disassembled cleanings had no effect on the occurrence of stoppages.” ⁸ This is in direct contradiction of what RDECOM advocates. RDECOM position is to clean the weapon 4-8 times a day, because “the one time you didn’t clean it may be the time it jams.” ⁹

Point 4. “Soldiers reporting a high frequency of lube application (one or more times per day) were more likely to experience stoppages.” ¹⁰ This directly contradicts RDECOM’s position not just to apply CLP more than one time a day, but also to “over-lube” weapons. The findings in the 2003-2005 RDECOM Army Research Lab study, which incidentally served as the instrument to revoke MILITEC-1’s NSNs, were, “The facts are that the minimal lubrication had the highest amount of failure and jamming, while the heavy lubricated weapon had the least amount of failure.”¹¹

Point 5. “Over 50% of soldiers utilizing the M4 and M16 reported that they never experienced a stoppage while in theater…” ¹² That means 40+% did have stoppages in theater.

Point 6. “Soldiers who frequently performed quick wipe down cleanings experienced more stoppages.” ¹³ This is a direct contradiction to RDECOM’s position using CLP up to 8 times a day.

Point 7. “Soldiers issued weapon cleaning kits were less likely to experience stoppages and more likely to be confident in weapon reliability,” ¹⁴ but only 64% of Soldiers are issued weapon cleaning kits. ¹⁵

This study supports Militec, Inc’s position and is also consistent with other official reports involving interviews with combat troops concerning their equipment.

This study is further evidence that the DoD IG Report dated November 2, 2006 was influenced by the supporters of Military Specifications that do not want competition or change in their organization.

¹ Soldiers Perspectives on Small Arms in Combat, Dec 2006, page 27 Adobe, page 23 actual document

² Soldiers Perspectives on Small Arms in Combat, Dec 2006, page 28 Adobe, page 24 actual document

³ Soldiers Perspectives on Small Arms in Combat, Dec 2006, page 7 Adobe, page 3 actual document ⁴ Soldiers Perspectives on Small Arms in Combat, Dec 2006, page pages 26-27 Adobe, 22-23 actual document ⁵ Soldiers Perspectives on Small Arms in Combat, Dec 2006, page 27 Adobe, page 23 actual document ⁶ Soldiers Perspectives on Small Arms in Combat, Dec 2006, page 28 Adobe, page 24 actual document ⁷ Soldiers Perspectives on Small Arms in Combat, Dec 2006, page 21 Adobe, page 17 actual document ⁸ Soldiers Perspectives on Small Arms in Combat, Dec 2006, page 7 Adobe, page 3 actual document ⁹ Army Stands By Official CLP Products, May 19 2006, ARNEWs, interview of MG Nadeau, RDECOM Cdr, by J.D. Leipold ¹⁰ Soldiers Perspectives on Small Arms in Combat, Dec 2006, page pages 26-27 Adobe, 22-23 actual document ¹¹ Bill Jensen, Weapon System Manager, Small Arms Support Center, LSA Anaconda, Iraq Stars and Stripes April 12, 2006 speaking about 2003-2005 RDECOM ARL study ¹² Soldiers Perspectives on Small Arms in Combat, Dec 2006, page 6 Adobe, page 2 actual document ¹³ Soldiers Perspectives on Small Arms in Combat, Dec 2006, page 7 Adobe, page 3 actual document ¹⁴ Soldiers Perspectives on Small Arms in Combat, Dec 2006, page 7 Adobe, page 3 actual document ¹⁵ Soldiers Perspectives on Small Arms in Combat, Dec 2006, page 19 Adobe, page 15 actual document