GAO Allows Fraud To Be Used Against Militec, Inc. according to, Allen Westheimer

 The below information sent to GAO proves the legal procedures were not followed when awarding our Natioanl Stock Number's (NSN's) to an unknown competitor. The MSDS document was undated which is a violation of the law. Why would GAO dismiss a case where there is a smoking gun? All GAO would say is our case has no merit. It's hard to believe GAO would sanction switching products during wartime, especially since troops in combat were re-ordering MILITEC-1 and not a product that was never used or even heard of before. The bait and switch was made possible by Augustine Funcasta at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ in 2005.

GAO needs to be held to account  as are other agencies when disputes arrive. I will prove fraud by Allen Westheimer and William Solis. Please recall, William Solis reported me to the Federal Protective Service (FPS) over a two sentence email asking him for a reply. I have hundreds of documents that will be posted to help investigators clean up the mess at GAO.

----- Original Message -----

From: "Allen D Westheimer" <WestheimerA@gao.gov>

To: "Bradley P. Giordani" <militec@militec-1.com>

Sent: Thursday, January 29, 2009 2:15 PM

Subject: Re: THIS INFO IS RESPONSIVE TO REP HOYER'S LETTER

Brad,

Thanks for the info. Also, please let Russ know that we received the binders of emails the other day and thank him as well. Allen

>>> "Bradley P. Giordani" <militec@militec-1.com> 1/29/2009 9:51 AM >>>

11828 Pika Drive, Waldorf, Maryland 20602 USA
Phone (301) 893-3910   Fax: (301) 893-8354
Internet: http://www.militec-1.com/

                                                             January 29, 2009
To Allen D. Westheimer, GAO
From Brad P. Giordani
Subject NSN Fraud/Substitution of Products                                                       

On March 17, 2005 Mr. Harry Broaddus of the Defense Supply Center Richmond (DSCR) approved (in record time) an incomplete source approval package (for another product) as a substitution to MILITEC-1. The incomplete package contained irreverent materials, two undated documents, including an undated Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) which is in violation of 29 CFR Part 1910.1200 (g) (2) (xi).

This misleading and grossly inadequate data package was subsequently approved by Rex Powell of Picatinny Arsenal, NJ (ARDEC) and confirmed its completeness in an email to Harry Broaddus of DSCR on March 17, 2005. See section 20 of the IG complaint @ http://www.militec.com/nadeau/IG_complaint1.html .

 In the spring of 2005, DSCR proceeded to award "one time buys" (calling for MILITEC-1's NSN's) to an unknown competitor (XXX); who had no track-record with DSCR while Militec, Inc was just awarded a Gold Medal by the commanders of both DLA and DSCR for perfect compliance for filling war orders from the previous year.

April 19, 2005 Augustine Funcasta of ARDEC sent Harry Broaddus of the DSCR a message stating to delay the ID/IQ contract calling for MILITEC-1's NSN. This ID/IQ sole-source solicitation was calling for 6.7 million plus dollars worth of MILITEC-1 and was to be awarded to Militec, Inc last March or April of 2005.

It would have been impossible to stop the ID/IQ solicitation from becoming a reality if it wasn't for the "over-looking" and fast-tracking incomplete and undated materials for NSN approval. These lighting speed and fraudulent actions caused our hard-earned solicitation from turning into a long term contract.

The five year ID/IQ solicitation for MILITEC-1 was justified by DSCR because the demand caused by thousands of troop requisitions was overwhelming the DSCR with one-time buys. DSCR was constantly backordered and ordered "Rush Delivery" on most orders. Many times DSCR asked us to modify orders that were subsequently increased, even though we had not received the corrected orders from them.

A summary of conflicting and inadequate information concerning the bait and switch of NSN's is numbered below. This information was received by FOIA from DSCR. This was the only technical material DSCR received from XXX (an unknown competitor) that justified MILITEC-1's NSN's to be granted to a company with no history or testing of its product.  I was not aware of this products existence until they received our orders using our NSN's at the beginning of 2005.

A summary of facts that were ignored by DSCR and ARDEC

1. The Flash Point for MILITEC-1 is 410 F.
2. The Flash Point for XXX is 374 F - per the Herguth report.
3. XXX uses 410 F as their Flash Point on the undated MSDS. It's not 410 F.
4. Their undated MSDS shows a pour point 0f -45 F (same as militec) and not the -60 F that appears on the Herguth report.
5. Their undated MSDS shows a specific gravity of 895 (much lower than militec's 1.142)
6. Their undated MSDS shows a boiling point of 650-790 F (much higher than militec's 528)
7. Their undated MSDS shows for Hazardous decomposition products states "generally none" (militec properly states HCL as a decomposition by-product)

In addition to the undated and misleading MSDS cited above, XXX also forwarded the following report from Herguth Labs, Inc to DSCR:

1. A brief lab report with two dates:  February 8, 2001 and February 20, 2001. This report only cites XXX and does not cite XXX General Purpose Lubricant (GPL). 
2. This report shows a flash point of 374 F for XXX and not 410 which is contained in the undated MSDS.
3. This report also shows a pour point of -60 F and not the -45 that is posted on the undated MSDS.
4. This report also shows viscosity @ 40 degrees C ASTM D445 @ 17.98 and not 39.03 as stated for the militec specification.

It is clear by the evidence received thru our FOIA, that there are multiple areas of inaccurate and incomplete information. I will summarize infractions below:

1. The XXX MSDS is undated which is a violation of 29 CFR part 1910.1200(g)(2)(xi)
2. They used the MILITEC-1 flash point and pour point on the GPL MSDS. The lab report from Herguth, Inc. provides the correct properties cited above.
3. Their specific gravity is so low "895" v. 1.1142 that it's not even close.
4. Their boiling point of 650-790 F is much higher than MILITEC-1's 528 F ( I have never seen a spread like this since its one number and not a broad  range)
5. As cited, the viscosity, pour point, flash point, specific gravity and boiling point are very different than the MILITEC-1 formula. However, the undated MSDS shows the exact flash and pour points. Impossible.

The link to the XXX FOIA'd technical data documents are on our site at http://www.militec1.com/nadeau/img/product_data_p1.gif. These incomplete and conflicting documents are also in the IG complaint in section 20.1.

DSCR originally rejected the XXX data package as incomplete in a message dated to XXX on February 24, 2005. See section 20 of the IG complaint.

 The Militec solicitation XXX was bidding on contained all the terms and conditions for alternative source rules, source approval packages and/or the requirements for a technical data package contained in all MILITEC-1 solicitations. These rules for the data package were spelled out by Jeff West @ DSCR to XXX in a letter dated February 24, 2005.

Jeff West of DSCR wrote to XXX on February 24, 2005 and said, "Your offer cannot be further evaluated because you did not submit a technical data package with your offer"

Jeff West further wrote on February 24, 2005 "Due to the critical nature of this procurement, it is mandatory that award of a contract proceed to the sole source supplier" This did not happen and XXX lubricant was promptly approved and Militec Inc's contracts were all awarded to XXX, despite our protests and incomplete documents.

Here are the rules that DSCR ignored: DSCR's alternate source qualification rules provide that the offeror of a proposed alternate source must provide clear information to establish its proposed product has the same salient properties and characteristics as the identified product and technical requirements contained in the NSN. See, e.g. DLA procurement regulations at 52.217-9002 Conditions for Evaluation and Acceptance of Offerors for Part Numbered Items (July 2002) at (c)"Alternate Product." DSCR and the Army approved an alternate source to MILITEC-1 under these MILITEC-1 NSN's even though the alternate product's documentation contained conflicting statements of technical capabilities, which conflicting statements did not indicate conformity with the salient properties and characteristics of MILITEC-1, the product identified in the NSN's, and it did not contain a properly dated Material Safety Data Sheet per 29 CFR Part 1910.1200(g)(2)(xi). Attachment 20, Documentation produced by DSCR in response to Freedom of Information Act Request, Attachment 20.1 (qualifying source data produced in response to FOIA request to DSCR.

After Militec Inc started to protest, MG Nadeau cancelled the NSN's for both products. Why would MG Nadeau cancel the NSN's to a brand new product (singled out to replace MILITEC-1) after a few months of awarding a new competitor our NSN's and contract awards? The only reason to award our NSN's to an unknown competitor at the last minute, and in record time was to deny Militec Inc its hard earned ID/IQ contract.

I strongly recommend that Harry Broaddus of DSCR, Augustine Funcasta of ARDEC and Rex Powell of ARDEC be interviewed about the inconsistencies that allowed a proven product that was in high demand to be taken over by a product that was never requested, tested or used in combat.

I have additional facts that I would like to share with you at your convenience.

Sincerely,

Brad P. Giordani
President
Militec, Inc.