Below, is the latest from the GAO-IG's office. Either, the IG has ALL the information that is required for their investigation, or they are going to dismiss my complaint. Allen Westheimer and William Solis did their very best to damaged my company and it's product. This is easily proved by the volume of material omissions, did not answer my congressman's two questions, would not answer (or acknowledge) any of my rebuttal documents that challenged their audit and for not allowing Militec Inc time to challenge the report, prior to release, other than viewing their draft for 30 minutes at GAO HQ.
Allen Westheimer and William Solis allowed us to take notes for the 30 minutes while we read the drat report. However, GAO insisted we had to surrender our notes after the 30 minutes. Does this sound like an honest broker? GAO allows government activities weeks to examine reports and includes their rebuttals in the report prior to release. This is mind boggling: A federal agency is allowed weeks to digest and comment on their reports, but a small company is not afforded the same courtesy? Westheimer proudly admitted that Militec Inc would be damaged more in the private sector than the public.
Allen Westheimer and William Solis concealed USG reports (as cited several times in this Blog) that would have altered their entire report. This is akin to a crime scene investigator throwing away critical DNA evidence.
I am going to ask the IG if their rules of not informing complainants also applies to member of congress. Since GAO works for congress, the reply, if any, will be informative
from: OIGHotline [mailto:OIGHotline@gao.gov]
Sent: Monday, June 27, 2011 12:31 PM
To: 'Brad Giordani'
Subject: RE: COMPLAINT CITING WILLIAM SOLIS AND ALLEN WESTHEIMER/PLEASE CONFIRM RECEIPT OF THIS COMPLAINT/ANSWER PLEASE
Mr. Giordani,
We have received your e-mail dated June 16, 2011. As we indicated in our earlier e-mail dated April 4, 2011, we received your complaint and we thank you for bringing this matter to our attention. It is the policy of OIG not to inform complainants about any actions our office may undertake regarding complaints we receive.
GAO's Office of Inspector General
From: Brad Giordani [mailto:militec@militec1.com]
Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2011 3:40 PM
To: 'Bradley P. Giordani'; OIGHotline
Cc: Fraud; russalogan@gmail.com; Rick1655@aol.com
Subject: RE: COMPLAINT CITING WILLIAM SOLIS AND ALLEN WESTHEIMER/PLEASE CONFIRM RECEIPT OF THIS COMPLAINT/ANSWER PLEASE
Dear Madam/Sir,
I am sending you this message that I cited to you in yesterday’s email. Why am I sending you this? Because you may not have clicked on the link to my Blog @ www.militec.blogspot.com where the below message is contained. Now you have the text so this information is part of my complaint/record to your office. I hope you do not reply with in-house rules about the proper procedures were not followed when I filed my complaint, or other bureaucratic means of dodging a direct question.
Allen Westheimer said FRAUD was OK since our NSN’s were never valid in the first place. If you all did your homework you might have realized that I will not drop this issue until Westheimer and Solis are jailed or kicked out of the USG. It’s troubling to me the secrecy (GAO rules/regs... as needed) about not commenting on, if there would be an investigation or not. This really depends on who is doing the asking as we all know.
May I please have a status of my complaint?
Thank you very much and have a nice day.
Respectfully,
Brad P. Giordani
President
Militec Inc
HOW CAN THE GAO JUSTIFY FRAUD WHEN EMERGENCY WAR ORDERS WERE DELAYED, DIVERTED AND THEN CANCELLED?
Allen Westheimer, Senior Analyst for GAO admitted that the Fraud used by an unknown competitor during 2005 to gain our NSN's was OK, since the MILITEC-1 NSN's issued in 1993 and reaffirmed again in 1995 were never legitimate, even though federal orders were being issued citing the NSN's. It's funny (not really) that a statement like this could be made, even though Mr. Westheimer could not find the rules that explains how NSN are issued. Rep Hoyer asked GAO for the governing rules for the issuance and cancellations of NSN's. I am excited to hear what the GAO-IG has to say on this subject of Westheimer justifying Fraud involving emergency war orders bound for theater.
This Fraud allowed for emergency war orders (stated on contracts) calling for MILITEC-1 (many are reorders) to be diverted and then cancelled without notifying the commanders in theater that their war requisitions were cancelled. This proves beyond any shadow of a doubt that Allen Westherimer and his supervisor William Solis believe they are above the law. Allen Westheimer admitted this in front of William Solis and others at their office in DC. I could not believe he said that, and Solis was as quiet as a little mouse hiding in the government shadows where its safe. Subsequently, when I pressed Solis for an answer, he reported me to the Federal Police. Can you believe that? Reports me because I want an answer to a simple question. The investigator saw no merit in Solis' complaint, but had to speak with me just the same.
There is also the subject of material omissions that are to numerous to mention, but contained below in my rebuttal to the GAO Dated July 9, 2009. If Mr. Westheimer would have included the most complete and comprehensive report from the Army-- this would have caused their dated materials (some 20 years old) to become obsolete, since it contradicted the information. In other words, if Westheimer would have told the truth and included the most recent reports from the Army, the report would have had to be altered based on the APG test that GAO did it's best to hide.
How are corrupt officials held to account when the IG and others will not investigate? They are not held to account and become embolden, especially since the GAO is held in such high regard as being politically neutral. I wonder if folks at GAO vote? Are they affiliated with any party? Do they have political opinions? This is where the IG is needed and needs to do its job since I will NOT drop this until Westheimer and Solis are fired, or better yet, jailed for allowing the continuance of Jammed Weapons that are responsible for dead troops. YES, these two rascals are responsible for the continuing gun jamming problem. Please recall. GAO could find no evidence of jammed weapons.
What do you call some one that prevents emergency war orders from reaching the commanders in a war zone that need to be resupplied so their weapons do not jam? I call them Traitors and they are Traitors. What do you call some one that claims, more than once, that the Fraud used -- that resulted in cancelled emergency war orders was justified? WOW. This is why I will never stop until Solis and Westheimer are kicked out of the USG.
From: Bradley P. Giordani [mailto:militec@militec1.com]
Sent: Wednesday, June 15, 2011 2:55 PM
To: OIGHotline
Cc: Fraud; Brad Paul Giordani
Subject: Re: COMPLAINT CITING WILLIAM SOLIS AND ALLEN WESTHEIMER/PLEASE CONFIRM RECEIPT OF THIS COMPLAINT/ANSWER PLEASE
Importance: High
Dear Madam/ Sir,
I have been updating my Blog www.militec.blogspot.com with critical information that you will find useful. I would appreciate a status on my complaint. If you will not give me a status (can't see why not) then please tell me for the record. You can choose to remain silent, however, that will not deter me from getting the truth from GAO and convincing Rep Issa to look into this. I was already told by a trusted source that we have a good shot at being heard by Rep Issa.
I have a recent letter from Rep Hoyer (May 26, 11) to the Army discussing MILITEC-1. The reason I say this: Steve Ham was let go all of a sudden and Steve and Jesse Tolleson (HASC staffer) were GAO's POC on the hill. This is a very serious issue that finally got on Rep Hoyer's radar screen and I firmly believe that if you do noting, Rep Hoyer may get involved.
Sincerely,
Brad P. Giordani
President
Militec, Inc.
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Tuesday, April 05, 2011 1:09 PM
Subject: Re: COMPLAINT CITING WILLIAM SOLIS AND ALLEN WESTHEIMER/PLEASE CONFIRM RECEIPT OF THIS COMPLAINT
Dear Madam/Sir,
Thank you for acknowledging my complaint involving William Solis and Allen Westheimer. Based on the policy of the OIG, how do I know if the IG will even look into this complaint? I have more information to share in addition to my Blog www.militec.blogspot.com -- so do I wait until I am asked for more information, or should I keep sending you relevant documentation? Would it help my case if Rep Hoyer sent a letter of support? May I have a contact at the OIG?
Myself and my company have been severely damaged by the volume of material omissions contained in the audit. If the two credible USG documents that were cited in my complaint (and in my rebuttal documents) been incorporated into the audit, most of the testing that GAO claims we failed (9 out of 11) would have become obsolete. This reminds me of an unethical investigator knowingly leaving out recovered DNA evidence from a crime scene.
Also, as I have reported, Mr. Westheimer admits fraud was used to gain our National Stock Numbers (NSN's) involving substitution of products witch caused emergency war orders to be delayed and then diverted to a company with no history and different technology. However, Mr. Westheimer also admitted that the Fraud was OK since our NSN's were never legitimate in the first place. It's unbelievable that this statement would have been made since Mr. Westheimer was unable to locate the records involving the proper issuance of the NSN's to determine legitimacy.
I hope that the OIG will promptly investigate these two areas at a minimum:
1. The volume of Material Omissions that were furnished in my complaint and rebuttal documents dated July 9, 2009
2. Fraud used to gain multiple and large DLA contracts and NSN's. FOIA'd documents from DLA proves inconsistencies and reveals smoking gun statements by DLA employee's.
There is allot more waste and abuse that I could describe in detail, however, if the OIG could focus on these two areas and stay clear of politics and favoritism, the facts will reveal a pattern and practice of unethical conduct. The fact that the audit changed course after a year (because of lost records) and then did not answer Rep Hoyer's specific request (but mentioned lubricant additive over 50 times), should be helpful for the IG.
I would appreciate a prompt reply to my questions. If my questions cannot be answered, then please state.
Sincerely,
Brad P. Giordani
President
Militec, Inc.
11828 Pika Drive
Waldorf Maryland. 20602
Office 301-893-3910
Fax 301-893-8354
Cell 240-682-0810
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Monday, April 04, 2011 2:30 PM
Subject: RE: COMPLAINT CITING WILLIAM SOLIS AND ALLEN WESTHEIMER/PLEASE CONFIRM RECEIPT OF THIS COMPLAINT
Mr. Giordani,
GAO's Office of Inspector General (OIG) has received your e-mail to our hotline. Thank you for bringing this matter to our attention. It is the policy of OIG not to inform complainants about any actions our office may undertake regarding complaints we receive.
GAO's Office of Inspector General
From: Bradley P. Giordani [mailto:militec@militec1.com]
Sent: Friday, April 01, 2011 12:34 PM
To: OIGHotline
Cc: Brad Paul Giordani
Subject: Re: COMPLAINT CITING WILLIAM SOLIS AND ALLEN WESTHEIMER/PLEASE CONFIRM RECEIPT OF THIS COMPLAINT
Dear Ms. Garcia,
Could you please confirm that you have received my complaint.
Thank you for your help and I am at your service.
Respectfully,
Brad
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Monday, March 28, 2011 2:21 PM
Subject: COMPLAINT CITING WILLIAM SOLIS AND ALLEN WESTHEIMER
March 28, 2011
United States Government Accountability Office
Office of the Inspector General
Attn: Ms. Frances Garcia
441 G Street NW VIA EMAIL ONLY
Room 1808
Washington, DC 20548
Subject: Re: - GAO-09-735R Defense Logistics dated June 25, 2009
Dear Ms. Garcia,
Representative Steny Hoyer wrote to the Honorable David Walker, Comptroller General, on February 5, 2008 requesting GAO assistance on two very specific and not complicated requests. (1) …”Effectively auditing the history of listing a particular product within the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) stock system” and (2) …”Determining if those federal agencies who were involved followed proper procedures and complied with all relevant laws and regulations in their actions taken to list and then delist MILITEC-1 within the national stock system”.
The response received on June 25, 2009 stated, “The purpose of this letter is to respond to your request for information regarding the test and evaluation process1 conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD) of a specific synthetic lubricant called MILITEC-1 that is produced by Militec, Inc., and the assignment and cancellation of national stock numbers (NSN) associated with that product.”
The test and evaluation portion was never requested by Rep. Hoyer. Further, it is not relevant or applicable to the specific request concerning the listing and delisting of MILITEC-1 in the stock system. This extraneous information also consumes approximately two thirds of the report and is a distraction from Hoyer’s request that was based on thousands of emails sent to Militec Inc by warfighters seeking a better lubricant.
GAO responded to the listing and delisting portion of the request by stating. (1) “However, DOD officials were unable to provide complete information regarding early DOD policies governing the assigning and canceling of NSNs due to the passage of time, as some of the responsible officials are no longer employed by DLA” and (2) “According to DOD officials, DOD has no single regulation for either assigning or canceling an NSN; although it has an established system for assigning, it does not have a comparable system for canceling an NSN”.
From what I have been told by Rep Hoyer’s staffer (Steve Ham) months after the investigation started, GAO significantly expanded their scope to include test and evaluation of military specifications; only to conclude “We did not, however, observe testing or evaluate test results, given the considerable lapse in time since such tests had occurred. We also did not evaluate the validity of the military specifications”
GAO was unable to evaluate the validity of the Military Specifications, or the results from the testing. I find this troubling since two thirds of the report is based on information that can’t be validated for accuracy; however, these reports are continuously cited throughout the report as MILITEC-1 failing tests, which we now learn cannot be evaluated for validity.
In addition to the added-on test and evaluation section and being unable to evaluate the validity of Military Specification’s, the report also included references to “lubricant additive (s) fifty-one times and goes back years before the product in question was invented and even had NSN’s. This deeply troubles me since the report does not answer Rep Hoyer’s two specific requests, appears to be one-sided and omits critical reports showing MILITEC-1 passing government testing.
Since GAO could apparently find no records of the governing rules for NSN listing and delisting used in the nineties (that apply to millions of currently approved products); another scope was needed to complete its report. GAO’s audit only revealed public army documents spanning over 25 years. There was no new information in the report that the Army and DLA had not previously reported. I have pasted below my main rebuttal document to the GAO report, dated July 9, 2009 and Militec rebuttal letters sent to William Solis who signed the June 25, 2009 report and has not yet responded to my letters asking for clarity. Since the reports release, I have sent Mr. Allen Westheimer and Mr. William Solis over twenty rebuttal documents without a single reply. However, Mr. Solis reported me to the Federal Protective Service (FPS) over an email asking politely for a reply. The rebuttal documents I have cited are on my new Blog @
militec.blogspot.com and hundreds of more documents sent to GAO will also be posted.
There have been millions of contracts issued for products during the nineties that require a valid NSN prior to contract award. How can there be no documents covering the basic requirements for listing and delisting of stock numbers that have been applied to products beginning in 1993 when MILITEC-1’s NSN’s were first awarded and through 2005 when they were blocked? Are there products being used today with NSN’s that were granted in the nineties, like MILITEC-1? If so, what was the requirement involved back then in order to approve a product for listing through the stock system?
The most troubling portion of the report are the volumes of material omissions absent in the report as evidenced by my volume of rebuttal letters to the GAO report and the extensive communications to William Solis and Allen Westheimer without a single reply. One such example of material omissions is the Army’s approval of MILITEC-1 passing a series of laboratory testing at Aberdeen Proving Grounds that was endorsed by the Army Surgeon General. In addition, MILITEC-1 passed environmental testing by the Navy’s Environmental Heath Center and was subsequently approved by the Naval Medical Command. These two reports, if entered into the June 25, 2009 report, would have caused the report to become more balanced and not one-sided. By omitting these and other documents, allowed for a series of incomplete and irreverent reports, to become noteworthy in the June 25th report.
The report also revealed another startling result; GAO wrote, “Army officials told us that they are unaware of any indications that weapons have jammed as a result of service members using the approved lubricant product” I have supplied GAO with over one-thousand warfighters emails, news reports, various government reports and releases documenting that weapons do in fact jam. In Rep Hoyer’s letter dated February 5, 2008, referenced a large quantity of emails being received by Militec only for GAO to report “We have reviewed many e-mailed testimonials that Militec, Inc., officials shared with us, and we note them in our report. However, irrespective of their number, these testimonials are not relevant to the testing and evaluation or assigning and canceling of national stock numbers for MILITEC-1, the review of which constituted our objectives” If it was not for the large volume of “emailed testimonials” by our service personnel requesting MILITEC-1 to prevent jammed weapons, the request by Rep Hoyer would not have been sent.
I have also written on my blog about Allen Westheimer stating that the “fraud used by a competitor was OK”, since MILITEC-1’s National Stock Number’s (NSN’s) were never valid in the first place.
Sincerely,
Brad P. Giordani
President
CC: Rep Hoyer
PROBLEMS WITH THE GAO REPORT DATED JUNE 25, 2009
Subject: Defense Logistics: Information on the Test and Evaluation and Assignment and Cancellation of National Stock Numbers as It Relates to MILITEC-1.
This rebuttal to the GAO report dated June 25, 2009 was prepared by Brad P. Giordani. This document and attachments are being furnished to, Allen Westheimer, senior analyst for GAO on July 10, 2009. Copies will be emailed and hand delivered to Steve Ham, Jim Wood and Jesse Tolleson.
Release date, July 9, 2009
1. Page 2, first paragraph: The vast majority (80%) of the GAO report contains information regarding “test and evaluation” that was neither requested nor relevant to the “listing or delisting”, of MILITEC-1’s NSN’s. No MilSpec or ASTM procedures were listed to support the efficacy or the real world correlation of the various T&E programs. GAO wrote: “We did not, however, observe testing or evaluate test results, given the considerable lapse in time since such tests had occurred. We also did not evaluate the validity of the military specifications”. How can GAO devote 80% of their report to MilSpec’s and testing if they can’t evaluate the results?
2. GAO mentioned “Lubricant Additive(s) 51 times, DLA Officials 18 times, DOD Officials 18 times, Army Officials 12 times, contains chlorine 10 times and negative corrosion protection 18 times. GAO also mentions 10 times, “live fire”. What GAO does not reveal is that these live fire tests are done inside of a laboratory using artificial sand. Please see the (attached) Desert Research Institutes (DRI) findings on the flaws with this testing using artificial sand and the problem with jammed weapons in combat.
3. The GAO report is 15 pages with seven additional pages as enclosures titled one and two. The seven pages of enclosures are duplicated in the main body of the report. Without mentioning lubricant additives 51 times and other non-small arms applications repeatedly, the report would be 5 pages or less.
4. Page 3, top paragraph: GAO’s main argument for supporting the army’s NSN cancellation policies is, “DOD officials told us that their procedures require DLA to obtain approval from the military services prior to assigning NSNs, to ensure that a product meets military specifications.” The issuance and reissuance of MILITEC-1’s NSN’s and the Army’s repeated approval of MILITEC-1 during the wartime was never based on MilSpec’s.
5. The DLA regulations that Militec, Inc., followed in 1993 were based on significant user demand by a variety of federal agencies, not MilSpec lab testing. Where are the governing rules by DLA that GAO is citing to support the Army’s position in 1993 and then again in 1995 that the NSN’s we not administered properly? Why weren’t these rules mentioned in 1995 when the NSN’s were reinstated and additional NSN’s were granted by DLA?
6. MILITEC-1’s NSN’s were never awarded based on MilSpec’s in 1993, 1995 and granted to our competitor in 2005. To illustrate this, why did DLA and the Army (ARDEC) grant our competitor our five NSN’s in 2005 (and retroactive contracts) when its product did not meet the same MilSpec for CLP?
7. Page 21, 2nd paragraph: and Page 5, last Paragraph: GAO wrote, “However, DOD officials were unable to provide complete information regarding early DOD policies governing the assigning and canceling of NSNs due to the passage of time, as some of the responsible officials are no longer employed by DLA.” GAO further wrote, “According to DOD officials, DOD has no single regulation for either assigning or canceling an NSN; although it has an established system for assigning, it does not have a comparable system for canceling an NSN.” Should there not be copies of the regulations that were in effect in 1993 and 1995 for the listing and delisting of NSN’s? GAO’s whole argument as to why the MILITEC-1’s NSN’s were never legitimate is based on the fact that DLA did not follow the regulations. Were there regulations in 2005 when the Army approved our NSN’s to a competitor? Or, were the regulations not followed?
8. Over eighty percent of the GAO report contains MilSpec conformance testing and laboratory conformance testing. Even if MILITEC-1 passed 99% of these tests, the product will still fail to meet the MilSpec for Cleaner Lubricant Preservative, (CLP). In order to qualify for the CLP MilSpec a product must pass each lab test, no exceptions. MILITEC-1 failed the first MilSpec lab test in 1990, (D). It was never reformulated to meet the MilSpec for CLP, because CLP is combustible, flammable and hazardous, as its Material Safety Data Sheet, (MSDS) reveals, (13). Products are continually tested against this MilSpec and related MilSpec’s in order for the Army to reinforce its position against competition. No commercial company has ever passed this MilSpec testing in more than 30 years. A candidate product must be combustible and flammable in order to pass these exacting lab tests.
9. MILITEC-1’s NSN’s, assigned in 1995 for small arms applications, remained active for eight years without a problem. Why did the Army wait eight years to move against MILITEC-1's NSN’s? No one in the Army had the authority to thwart the 1995 agreement, or to override the direction of the AMC commanding general, Paul Kern, in 2003 that reinstated MILITEC-1’s NSN’s, with the full backing of the RDECOM commanding general. GAO is silent on these two generals’ support and the resulting letter from DLA dated October 14, 2003, (1). The moment these two commanding generals retired, BG Nadeau stepped in and cancelled MILITEC-1's war orders and NSN’s at the request of Picatinny, claiming after eight years MILITEC-1 did not meet MilSpec. The new commanding general for AMC was not involved in this decision and never corresponded with us.
10.Page 3, last paragraph: GAO has received the Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for CLP, where it states it is combustible, hazardous and flammable, and its vapors may catch fire, (13). GAO does not reference the MSDS hazards for CLP, or that MILITEC-1 is approved by the Naval Medical Command for submarine use, (4). GAO also does not mention that MILITEC-1 passed the health and safety testing in 2005 by the Army at APG, (5). The Army’s specifications for CLP have been modified 18 times in the past 30 years and it’s still combustible, hazardous and flammable.
11.GAO does not consider thousands of emails from troops in combat stating MILITEC-1 works and MilSpec CLP does not as evidence. Nor does GAO use any of the U.S. Coast Guard information that favors MILITEC-1 over CLP in its report, (19). GAO did not reference emails that GAO’s, Oscar Mardis, sent, and were replied to by warfighters when asked for their feedback, (attached). If troop email is not evidence, why did GAO, use Militec-supplied emails from warfighters, asking for their opinion, and then leave this material out of its report? How can MilSpec laboratory testing be considered real-world evidence for combat usage of a product, if there is no field testing to support and correlate to the lab testing, especially when field users vehemently prefer MILITEC-1?
12.Page 11, first paragraph: Thousands of warfighters’ emails, using military computers and military email accounts are solid evidence that GAO completely discounts as “laudatory testimonials”. These emails are being sent by executive officers, commanding officers, including captains, majors and colonels. We have even received requests from generals serving in combat. GAO’s, Allen Westheimer, would not respond when asked if emails sent from combat are evidence. [[Perhaps, Allen would on another subject.]]
13.Page 6, 4th paragraph: Militec has had Department of Homeland Security and Coast Guard orders that were blocked because DLA could not differentiate between military and federal law enforcement users in 2003. If what GAO is saying is true, why aren’t MILITEC-1's NSN’s just blocked from military users? How can the Army cancel MILITEC-1’s NSN’s when the NSN request for assignment was not initiated by Army? Militec has dozens of federal customers that are not allowed to order from DLA, despite what GAO is stating. GAO wrote: “For example, according to DLA officials, if an item meets the needs of a civilian user but does not meet military specifications, it retains its NSN listing but is specifically blocked from purchase by DOD users”.
14.Page 17, first paragraph: GAO knowingly left out two very significant health and safety reports that can be evaluated for validity, (4 and 5). However, GAO included an 18-year-old statement (without any testing) that said, “The study also found that MILITEC-1 posed a possible health hazard following both acute and chronic overexposure to the skin, and it noted that the product should not be recommended for use”. Also, what does the velocity of a bullet have to do with the CLP Milspec or the NSN process from a 1991 report?
15.Page 7, bottom paragraph: GAO was provided a complete contact list for other federal users, but only mentions three. GAO also fails to mention what “broader needs” the troops have with an M-16 lubricant that other federal agencies do not. GAO has been furnished the complete POC list, but only refers to three users.
16.Page 9, 3rd paragraph; The diesel lubricants at this time also contained chlorine, though not as much. GAO failed to mention other navy diesel lubricants and MilSpec CLP contained chlorine. GAO mentions chlorine 18 times.
17.Page 16, 3rd paragraph: It was ADM Donahue, the Chief Engineer (GAO calls fleet) for the Atlantic Fleet, who authorized the testing. GAO failed to list the tests we had passed during the two year approval, (E). GAO fails to mention that in 1991, ADM Donahue sponsored the MILITEC-1 NSN’s for assignment, (27). This action by ADM Donohue and the Atlantic’s fleet two-year approval caused a backlash by Naval Sea Systems Command that resulted in the advisory to stop using MILITEC-1.
18. Page 18, 2nd paragraph: The NRL report never said would result; it said may result in white metal damage based on a European study on different chlorine containing products, and not MILITEC-1. NRL only conducted a four ball wear test (using twice the amount needed) and other MilSpec conformance tests that did not pertain to small arms. This was not a test and evaluation and used no bearings in their lab tests.
19.Page 11, 2nd paragraph: For GAO to write, “Army officials told us that they are unaware of any indications that weapons have jammed as a result of servicemembers’ using the approved lubricant product”, This statement is false and parrots the Army’s position, and discounts the warfighters’ experience in combat since Desert Storm. Why would the current instructions by, MG Nadeau, to clean a weapon up to “eight times a day” with CLP, if weapons did not jam?, (26). As also mentioned in number two above, the Army’s own Desert Research Institute (DRI) mentions weapons jamming in combat, (attached) and the Stars and Stripes articles report on “thousands of jammed weapons get fixed”, (18).
20.GAO continues to rely on verbal information from “DOD officials” instead of relying on public USG documents for their information. The majority of GAO’s conclusions are based on what they were told by the very people (our enemies) who were overridden by OSD, and had to answer numerous congressional inquiries. GAO likes to use these terms for credibility purposes; “According to DOD officials,” (18 mentions) “According to DLA officials,” (18 mentions) without citing their department or civil service rating. GAO never mentions if there was a previous bias with these people.
21.Page 12, last paragraph: How can eight years of using our NSN’s thru DLA without a problem are blamed on a “computer system update” that failed to block our NSN’s? This computer system update was separate and apart from the other mistakes made by DLA in the listing and delisting of MILITEC-1’s NSN’s. If all of these mistakes are true, why was it that 2.3 million dollars of sales were made to DOD with 1,800 requisitions to back this up thru DLA computers after multiple mistakes occurred? GAO is also calling hundreds of thousands of dollars, “uptick”, when GAO previously reported that only 3,000 dollars were purchased. GAO is suggesting the “temporary issuance was granted” for the use of MILITEC-1 during war time was based on “concerns that the Army was biased against their product”. For GAO to report that the Army allowed MILITEC-1 to be purchased and used (during a war) for fear of being portrayed as biased, is incomprehensible. Was the “wartime demand” for MILITEC-1 evaluated as the Army said it would when our NSN were unblocked? Perhaps DLA orders (by the troops) could help the Army in assessing wartime demand? DLA awarded Militec, Inc. a Gold Medal in 2003 for perfect compliance.
22.Page 13, first paragraph: Why would a future independent test allow the Army to reverse its position, again, and allow troops to order MILITEC-1 thru DLA for 18 months? This was not an independent test; it was done at APG with Picatinny’s help. What is the basis for calling this an independent test? Why would the Army keep reversing its position, when there is no evidence outside of their labs that MILITEC-1 caused problems? The Army kept reversing its position because the troops were demanding MILITEC-1.
23.The Army also reversed its position on under-lubing to over-lubing based on the 2005 artificial dust test at Aberdeen. GAO does not address this, or the Army’s Desert Research Institutes (DRI) report on this test using the wrong contaminate and that jammed weapons are in fact a problem in combat. The DRI confirms our position that jammed weapons occur with the use of CLP. This over-lubing dust test was another reason our dry lubricant failed the laboratory live fire test. The Desert Research Institute (DRI) at Yuma Proving Grounds (YPG) should have had and wanted this responsibility for desert testing, since this is its domain. DRI claims the dust test is faulty, (attached) as we do, because the dust particles are too large and not the consistency of real sand. If the Army used real sand, it would experience the same problems as the troops encounter in harsh desert environments with weapons jamming. GAO only quotes (out of context) MG Nadeau’s mandate on constant cleaning, but never mentions up to eight times a day may be required if a weapon is fired or not, (F). How do you clean a weapon in a sustained gunfight, or if you are on patrol in a dust storm?
24.Page 14, first and 2nd paragraphs: If warfighters’ testimonials (GAO now calls customers) in combat are not relevant (or real world) in this report (they test and evaluate too- and drive the NSN’s) then what is relevant? GAO wrote, “specifications are in part based on real world conditions, as experienced by the warfighter.” What are the real word conditions GAO is referring too? Is repeated use of a product in combat real world with thousands of emails claiming MILITEC-1 works better than CLP?
25. Page 14, 2nd paragraph: Why did Rep Hoyer include in his letter that troops were in large quantities emailing Militec, Inc, if these testimonials are not relevant”? Where is the real world testing by the troops that GAO is referring too? Field use over time (in combat) is “real world” and should be the final proving ground. Email reporting from combat provides lessons learned. What is more credible than thousands of emails from troops in combat all saying the same thing regarding MILITEC-1 vs. MilSpec CLP?
26.GAO fails to mention the Coast Guard tests MILITEC-1 has passed for their approval and the follow-on letter from the Coast Guard commandant. (19). GAO fails to report that MILITEC-1 has been approved by most weapons manufacturers and that the majority of federal law enforcement agencies mandate MILITEC-1. This is easily verified and the fact MILITEC-1 has protected the last four commanders in Chiefs’. GAO also does not report it cannot find evidence outside of Army Materiel Command (AMC) circles to support the efficacy of MilSpec CLP. No weapons manufacturer has approved or advises use of MilSpec CLP, unless the Army mandates it on its weapons because a company manufacturers its weapons under contract.
CRITICAL INFORMATION IGNORED BY GAO AND MATERIAL OMISSIONS
CRITICAL INFORMATION IGNORED BY GAO AND MATERIAL OMISSIONS
18. Stars and Stripes articles proving jammed weapons occur and how much lube to use. GAO has seen no evidence that weapons jam. Emails from military computers from Iraq and Afghanistan (citing jammed weapons) don’t count as evidence by GAO and the DRI report is dismissed. http://www.militec1.com/nadeau/StarsAndStripes.html
CRITICAL INFORMATION IGNORED BY GAO AND MATERIAL OMISSIONS
25. Southwest Research Institutes (SWRI) vehicle oil tests where MILITEC-1 passed. http://militec1.com/labtest.html The Army has a facility here and has been provide these tests.
26. Picatinny Arsenal’s, Gus Funcasta’s, email blaming the troops (not CLP) for jammed weapons experienced by the 507th Maintenance Company. Troops were killed and captured because all of their weapons jammed. GAO is still unable to find evidence of jammed weapons. http://militec1.com/mildocs/GusFuncasta.html
27.January 8, 1991: First NSN request by the Commander Atlantic Fleet. http://militec1.com/NSN2.html This request for NSN assignment was based on operational field use after two years of testing MILITEC-1.
REPORTS TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT
A. Picatinny Arsenal’s, SWAT report, http://www.militec1.com/swat.pdf mentioning elbow grease as the best lubricant and not CLP. This report was released in word format and the editing process (which was not erased) reveals a bias towards MILITEC-1. The only reason this report was hastily released in word format was to counter the Army’s first After Action Report (AAR) dated May 15, 2003, that favored MILITEC-1 over CLP.
B. Official USMC Jeep test: The MILITEC-1 conditioned motor ran 25 minutes under full power and the MilSpec oil motor ran 12 minutes losing power. http://militec1.com/MarineCorpsTest1.html GAO did not mention the MILITEC-1 Jeep ran twice as far under full power and the engine could be restarted, where the other Jeep had a seized motor.
G. The Army, DLA and GAO accepts the fact that fraudulent documents were used by a competitor to receive MILITEC-1’s NSN’s. The MSDS was not dated and different specs for same formula were used. There must have been current regulations in 2005 governing the listing and delisting of NSN’s? http://www.militec1.com/nadeau/product_data_p1.html
For additional information regarding this document please contact the undersigned.
Brad P. Giordani
President
Militec, Inc.
11828 Pika Drive
Waldorf, Maryland. 20602
Office 301-893-3910
Fax 301-893-8354